The West might have dissuaded Russia from invading Ukraine

 There was a story Vic Feather told of his younger days when he was a rugby league player. In a particular match, a forward - built like a brick outhouse - took a delight in fouling the youngster at every opportunity. Feather took this for just so long until he finally thought "in for a penny, in for a pound", drew himself up to his full five-foot-and-a-bit, and punched the forward on the nose. The blow clearly hurt Feather more than his opponent, who exclaimed: "You cheeky little bugger!" - but left Feather alone for the rest of the match. I guess Feather told it to illustrate his approach to negotiation on behalf of his union and later as general secretary of the TUC, confronted often by much better-endowed organisations. This is all from memory. He told the story on either Desert Island Discs or in a Parkinson interview or both, but the BBC has not made either freely available. (The Parkinson session is particularly intriguing. The other guests were impressionist Mike Yarwood and famous concert pianist Arthur Rubinstein.)

The opportunity to punch Putin on the nose metaphorically came in 2014 when Russian elements shot down a Malaysian Airlines airliner on flight MH17 over internationally-recognised Ukrainian territory. This was a time to send in the SAS to secure the crash site, gather evidence and act on behalf of the relations of those on board, most of whom were from friendly countries. It's the sort of thing that Paddy Ashdown would have pressed for if he had been alive at the time. But perhaps the SAS is no longer capable of such action because of defence cuts.

The subject of deterrence came up on the airwaves last week as 29th August was the tenth anniversary of the vote in the House of Commons on whether to intervene in Syria after Assad and Russian forces had used chemical weapons in the civil war there. One or two MPs  then on the "ayes" side (which lost narrowly) suggest now that if the West had shown itself ready to take military action against the Assad regime, then a signal would have been sent to his Russian allies and Putin would not have gone ahead with the annexation of Crimea and the downing of MH17 a year later. 

Crippling Assad's air force and other military infrastructure may well have begun the demolition of his family's rule in Syria. But to be truly effective in restoring democratic rule, air strikes would have to be followed up by a force on the ground, as was shown in the action in former Yugoslavia. This was not an option for an over-stretched British army and was highly unlikely to be approved by US Congress affected by the sight of body-bags coming home from previous conflicts. So the most likely outcome would have been a continuing civil war and an eventual takeover by Da'esh (or ISIL as they like to call themselves), one of the most vicious and bloody actors in the history of guerrilla warfare. Judging by their earlier actions against Christian and Yazidi communities, a Da'esh administration would have wasted no time in eliminating non-Sunni-Muslim populations.

Russia may well have been inhibited after a 2013 intervention by the West in Syria. However, peace in Ukraine would have been bought at the cost of the lives of thousands of Syrians.